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Independent reference on the Future Railway Mobile Communication System

Apply · 2.7

Identities, service registration and functional aliases

Time: about 9–12 minutes including the task; estimate

Guiding question: How is an operational function reached when people and devices change?

Learning objective: You separate network identity, service access and operational assignment.

Prerequisites: Previous lessons through 2.6, particularly the case file developed there.

Familiar device, authorised user, current role

In 1.2 Lea and Amir each had their own reachable device; the call to the function still reached Lea’s device. Now we perform this change in the pilot setup. Three assignments must be kept separate.

An identity identifies a participant or function in the relevant system context. The network subscriber identity enables assignment to mobile-network access. The service user identity identifies the user in the communication service. The functional identity describes the operational role under which the user is to be reachable. None of these details answers all the other questions on its own.

A Functional Alias is a functional designation in the MC/FRMCS context. It enables a communication partner to be addressed through an operational function rather than only a permanently person-specific destination identifier. Assignment to the authorised user must be active and valid. [S05, S06, sections 11.6 and 21.3]

The SIM or associated subscriber profile supports identification for network access. It contains the intended subscriber and security information, not automatically the current operational role. It therefore does not automatically establish that Amir has taken over the current driver role. Device handover and role handover are different processes. The subscriber profile describes network access; it is not the physical device. In this lesson we follow the assignment between network access, service user and function.

The life cycle of an assignment

Here, a life cycle describes the states from creating to ending an assignment. For Talbahn, consider four teaching states:

State Statement to clarify
Before Lea is assigned to the function being considered
Takeover requested Amir requests the role; this does not yet mean a confirmed change
New assignment confirmed The system has accepted the intended change according to the agreed rules
Afterwards New functional calls reach Amir; Lea's previous assignment has ended accordingly

This table is not a prescribed protocol. It makes evidence needs visible. Behaviour under duplicate registration, connection loss or delayed confirmation must be specified.

Keep function and location separate

“Driver of train 1234” describes a function. “Responsible office for this section” additionally involves geographical responsibility. Location information must be mapped to a destination according to rules; it does not itself decide operational responsibility.

In interworking with GSM-R, the intended identities must be mapped across the system boundary. A correct name display does not prove a correct callback or group join. Behaviour is therefore tested in both directions. [S11]

Service registration before the role-based call

Mobile-network registration, SIP registration and MC service authorisation are separate procedures. Service sign-in involves identity verification, an appropriate profile and authorisation for permitted MC services. An access token is a technical authorisation credential with a limited scope; it is neither a train number nor an operational role. The service specification describes preparation and service-specific authorisation. [S09, clause 6.1]

An expired credential may prevent new service use while a device remains registered on the radio network. Talbahn therefore records time, identity and responsible function for each state. The role “driver of train 1234” is then assigned to the intended service user on this basis. A role handover cannot replace the independent service-permission check.

Check your understanding

After Amir's role takeover, calls still reach Lea. What information do you need before identifying a cause? Formulate a positive test case and a conflict-related test case.

Model answer

You need the requested and confirmed assignment states with their timing, the destination resolution actually used, and the agreed conflict rules. Positive case: after the confirmed change, Niko reaches Amir through the function. Conflict case: a second simultaneous takeover is handled according to the defined rule and clearly indicated to the user. Without that rule, no specific expected behaviour can be invented.

Additional application

The device remains network-registered but service access is rejected. Which additional state needs checking?

Model answer

Check service identity, profile and MC service authorisation separately from network registration. An expired credential is also a hypothesis to investigate.

What to remember

  • Network, service and functional identities are different.
  • Role takeover needs confirmed states and conflict rules.
  • Displayed names do not replace behavioural testing.

Your Talbahn case file

Extend the role-change case from 1.3 with states and evidence needs. Preserve the unresolved conflict behaviour.

Sources

  • S05 · UIC FRMCS FRS FU-7120

    UIC FRMCS FRS FU-7120

    Version: 2.1.0, 29 April 2025 · Checked: 2026-10-11

    Scope: Functional requirements, identities, Functional Alias, voice and hazard communication.

    Limitations: Teaching foundation, not evidence of complete product support.

    Used in: 1.2, 1.3, 1.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.15, 2.20, 3.2

  • S06 · UIC FRMCS SRS AT-7800

    UIC FRMCS SRS AT-7800

    Version: 2.1.0, 30 April 2025 · Checked: 2026-10-11

    Scope: System requirements, architecture, service/transport interaction and mobility. Functional Alias: 11.6/21.3; voice profiles: 24.2.3.3 and 24.3.3.2–4; TSCTRL: 6.4.1.3.

    Limitations: The project baseline must specify the applicable parts.

    Used in: 1.3, 2.4, 2.7, 2.9, 2.11, 2.13, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, 2.18, 2.19, 3.2, 3.3, 3.16

  • S09 · ETSI TS 103 765-2: FRMCS Service Stratum

    ETSI TS 103 765-2: FRMCS Service Stratum

    Version: 1.1.1, January 2026 · Checked: 2026-10-11

    Scope: Service architecture; SIP Core definition; registration and MC services.

    Limitations: Do not equate IMS with SIP; the architecture allows the specified SIP Core alternatives.

    Used in: 1.9, 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.14, 2.19, 2.22, 3.5, 3.16

  • S11 · ETSI TS 103 792: FRMCS/GSM-R Interworking

    ETSI TS 103 792: FRMCS/GSM-R Interworking

    Version: 1.1.1, January 2026 · Checked: 2026-10-11

    Scope: Interworking architecture and defined functional mediation.

    Limitations: Demonstrate support per function and combination; not universal ETCS translation.

    Used in: 1.10, 2.7, 2.20, 2.22

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